INTRODUCTION
This Essay examines the contours of what I have elsewhere called the new constitutional order! with re~ect to international human rights and federalism. The background is my suggestion that the U.S. political-constitutional system is on the verge of moving into a new constitutional regime, following the end of the New Deal-Great Society constitutional regime. 2 The Supreme Court's innovations in the law of federalism in connection with Congress's exercise of its powers over domestic affairs has provoked tCarmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A., 1967, Harvard University; M.A., 1971, Yale University, J.D., 1971, Yale University Law School. I would like to thank L.
Michael Seidman, Peter Spiro, and Carlos Manuel Vazquez for their comments on a draft of this Essay, and Jacqueline Shapiro for her usual top-notch work as a research assistant.
1. See Mark Tushnet, Foreword: The New Constitutional Order and the Chastening of Constitutional A mbition, 113 HARv.1. REV. 29 (1999) .
2. For a discussion of the idea of constitutional regimes, and for a brief description of the New Deal-Great Society regime, see Tushnet, supra note 1, at 34-36. A shorthand description of the concept of constitutional regimes is that they are reasonably stable sets of political and constitutional arrangements within which political actors determine policy based on their shared understanding of the regune's fundamental organizing principles. THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:841 speculation about the implications of those innovations for the national government's power with respect to foreign affairs. 3 Most of the speculation has been that the Court is about to-or at least should-en~age in what I have called projects of restoration and revolution. That is, the Court will, or should, return to an understanding of the relation between the nation's power with respect to foreign affairs that prevailed before the New Deal-Great Society era. According to the conventional understanding of the New Deal-Great Society order, the national government had essentially plenary power over an:r matter fairly described as implicating the nation's foreign affairs. Congress rarely pressed the limits of this plenary power during the New DeaI-Great Society era,6 but political actors agreed that Congress had broad power. That agreement may have conditioned the policy-making environment by making available for serious consideration proposals that would involve expansive exercises of power, thereby pushing policybargaining in an internationalist direction. Thus, acknowledging linuts on Congress's constitutional authority with re~pect to foreign affairs would not only change dramatically our understanding of what Congress might do, but might also have real effects on polIcy outcomes. I propose in this Essay a more modest perspective on the relation between the Court's new federalism doctrine and the constitutional regulation of the nation's conduct of foreign affairs. Focusing on international human rights, I argue that the Court's initiatives are likely to be rather small. This chastened ambition, as I have called it, results in part from the structure of politics in the current regime, but more from the accumulated weight of precedent and, even more, from the continuing importance of U.S.
3. Probably the most prominent such speculation is Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REv. 390 (1998) (ar~ing, inter alia, that the Court's doctrine dealing with foreign affairs shoUld De harmonized with its new domestic federaIism doctrine). For additional discussion, see infra notes 76-100 and accompanying text. 4. Mark Tushnet, What is the Supreme Court's New Federalism?, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 927 (2000) . 5. Another part of the conventional understanding was that within the national government the President had essentially plenary power with respect to such matters, even in the face of congressional disagreement. This aspect of the New Deal-Great Society constitutional order is not a focus of my concern here. 6. See, e.g., Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994) (a case in which Congress did not exercise its power over foreign commerce to displace a controversial state tax). This contrasts with its actions in domestic matters, where it did exercise its powers quite expansively.
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THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 843 government action in the international order. Section I! of this essay outlines the place of forei~ affairs in the New Deal-Great Society constitutional order, and the reasons for thinking that they will occupy a somewhat different place in the new constitutional order. Section ill describes some problems where international human rights and domestic constitutional law intersect. Section IV then examines the Supreme Court's federalism doctrine and its application to foreigtl. affairs generally and to the problems described in the preceding Part.
I!. FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDERS
Harold Koh has described processes by which international legal norms are incorporated into the domestic legal order? I adapt his term to describe the incorporation of international poltcy concerns as well. 8 After such concerns are incorporated and internalized in the policy-making process, they must be integrated with the remainder of constitutional law. The conventional wisdom about the way in which foreign affairs were integrated into the New Deal-Great Society constitutional order can be easily stated. The United States came to playa major role in international affairs, initially in W orId War I! and then as the leader of anticommunist forces during the Cold War. 9 A bipartisan consensus emerged supporting that role as traditionally isolationist segments of both major parties were displaced. The consensus was that the new U.S. role required maximum flexibility in developing international policies. 10 The nation's power with respect to foreign affairs therefore had to be plenary.11 As Martin Flaherty puts it, the 7. See Harold Hongju Koh, Bringing International Law Home, 35 Hous. L. REv. 623, 642 (1998) (describing, inter alia, political and legal "internalization" of international norms).
8. For additional discussion of legal internalization, see text accompanying notes-infra. 9. For a discussion, see W. Michael Reisman, War Powers: The Operational
Code of Competence, 83 AM.J.lNT'LL. ro, 780-83 (1989) . 10 . For a discussion of the manner in which constitutional doctrine was transformed, stressing that the process took place over along period and was not directly connected to the New Deal itself, see G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 33-93 (2000). 11. Responding in part to Senator Bricker's proposals to amend the Constitution, the consensus came to accept the proposition that this plenary power was limited by the Constitution's individUal rights provisions. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) . For a discussion of the Bncker proposals, see DUANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY: A TEST OF EISENHOWER'S POUTICAL LEADERSffiP (1988) .
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THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:841 New Deal, W orId War II, and "the emergence of the Soviet Union led to a rejection of formalist nineteentli-century understandings, fostering instead a regime that was executive-centered in terms of separation of powers, nationalist as a matter of federalism, and internationalist in general orientation. "12 Formalist doctrines, in which some matters might be categorically excluded from the foreign affairs power, were replaced by balancing tests that gave the government what seemed to be the appropriate degree of flexibility .13 With the collapse of the Soviet Union, "parochial doctrines reemerged. Domestically, 'states' rights' is no 10nRer a segregationist slogan but once again constitutional doctrine." 4 The declining threat of international crisis removed one source of nationalIzing pressure. IS In Jack Goldsmith's terms, at least some of the internatIonal issues currently raisin~ questions of domestic constitutional law "are from any perspectIve much less significant" than the ones arising from the Cold War. 16 One of Goldsmith's examples is the Massachusetts law under which the state refused to contract with businesses that themselves did business in Myanmar (Burma) .17 That he uses such an example is symptomatic of another feature of the modem constitutional order -the decay of consensus on what matters in international affairs. Supporters of the claim that international human rights matter a great deal have significant political leverage within the Democratic party, and rather less in the Republican party .. Similarly, the parties seem to disagree 12. Martin S. Flaherty, History Right? Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as "Supreme Law of the Land," 99 COLUM. L. REv. 2095, 2095-96 (1999). 13. See Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1395, 1409 (1999) 
Court's traditional rule-like approach to the judicial foreign relations doctrines might have seemed unsatisfactory because any errors of under-or overinclusiveness were thought to be unacceptably costly in the Cold War world"). 14. Flaherty. supra note 12, at 2096. 15. See Curtis A. Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1089, 1105 (1999) ("The end ofthe Cold War era also is a'likely factor in the shift away from foreIgn affairs exceptionalism, since there is now a reduced need for the national government to speak with one voice in international relations, and because many of the exceptionalism decisions . . . clearly seem to be a product of the Cold War era."). See also Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1223, 1241-46 (1999) (describing the historical Cold War context in which foreign affairs doctrine was shaped).
16. Goldsmith, supra note 13, at 1412. 17. See id. The Massachusetts law was held preempted by federal legislation in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) .
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THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 845 systematically about the appropriate role in U.S. foreign policy of a generalized concern for human rights. IS In addition to these political elements, the institutional environment of modem intemationallaw differs in several ways from the institutional environment associated with the foreign affairs policy-making process during the New Deal-Great Society constitutional order. The participants in intemationallaw-making differ. Traditional intemationallaw involved the direct creation of binding rules in bilateral or multilateral treaties, while modem international law establishes free-standing law-making institutions to generate norms. 19 Domestically, the process of participating in international law-making differs as well. Historically, wnat mi~ht be called ordinary interest groups, typically oriented to achiev10g material goals, were the major interest group participants in the domestic processes that fed into treaty-maKing. 20 Now nongovernmental organizations with ideological coIlltn.ltments, interest groups, to be sure, but of a different sort, are important participants 10 die process, and some of these organizations operate across national borders.
These new features of the constitutional order suggest that the contours of constitutional doctrine might change as well. The Massachusetts Burma Law case may provlde a hint of such changes. One doctrine associated with the New Deal-Great Society: order was a strong presumption that the national power over foreign affairs preempted state legislation, even when Congress had not 10 fact directly exercised its power and even when the state legislation was not obviously incompatible with what Congress had in fact done. 21 THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:841 case by invoking this presumption. It did not. Instead, it adopted what appears to be a studiously neutral stance, applying ordinary principles of statutory interpretation with no concession in its lDterpretive aIWroacli to the fact that the state law implicated foreign affairs. A political scientist might think that the Court's neutral aRproach resulted in part from some relatively novel characteristics of the Burma Law. State efforts to influence other nations' governments through their purchasing activities are a rather recent development. Perhaps more important, the Burma Law was the product of a new policy-making process, in which transnational non-governmental organizations have come to act in the way traditional interest groups did.23 These transnational NGOs differ from most traditional interest groups. Typically, the latter have some direct material interest in the legislation they seek,24 while transnational N GOs typically assert only moral interests. 25 Perhaps the New Deal-Great Society presumption in favor of preemption made sense to a Court accustomed to assessing legislation emerging from a policy-making process dominated by the traditional interest groups that were an integral part of that order. The new constitutional order might be SKeptical about that process and adopt a state-favoring !'resumption against preemption. But, the new policy-making enVIronment may have left the Court in a more neutral interpretive position.
Accordiri~ to Koh, international norms become sources of domestic law, 6 but, as I have indicated, they are only one among 22. For my analysis of the case, see Mark Tushnet, Globalization and Federalism in a Post Printz World, 36 TULSA L.J. 11 (2000) . I should note, however, that other scholars believe that what the Court did was actually inconsistent with its avowedly neutral interpretive stance. I believe that those scholars have not yet made their case, largely because to do so would require comparing the Court's performance in the BurmaLaw case with its performance in other preemption cases not involving foreign affairs, a task that these scholars have not yet undertaken.
23. But see Koh, supra note 7, at 647 (describing the role of transnational NGOs in the antislavery movement of the 1800s).
24. Of course they may also have moral interests, and almost always press their policies on public interest grounds. Nonetheless, the element of material interest is so common as to be a structural feature of traditional interest group lobbying.
25. Again, this is not to contend that transnational NGOs do not have, or at least are not supported by groups that have, material interests Qabor unions supporting international human nghts claims about working conditions being the obvious example), but only that the place of material interest is substantially smaller than in tr3.ditional interest groups.
26. See Koh, supra note 7.
THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 847 many such sources. They must be integrated into domestic constitutional law, harmonized with other doctrines. The New Deal-Great Society constitutional order harmonized foreign affairs to other J:!rovisions by giving foreign affairs primacy.27 Ordinarilyforeign affairs policies miglit express the United States' nationcil interest narrowly understood. Sometimes, however, those policies would adopt international norms. Even then the New Deal-Great Society constitutional order gave them primacy. The new constitutional order may treat international norms as on roughly the same plane as other sources of law. 28 The project of integration would then become more complex. The next Section describes a few areas in which U.S. constitutional law will have to engage in that project.
ffi. FEDERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
The project of integrating international legal norms and domestic constitutional law may be a large one once domestic constitutional law is not automatically subordinated to international norms. 29 On some interpretations, the North 27. Critics refer, somewhat pejoratively I think, to "foreign affairs exceptionalism." See, e.g., Bradley, sUp!a note 15, at 1104. Peter Spiro pointed out to me that the New Deal-Great Society constitutional order gave primacy to foreign affairs primarily, if not exclusively, with respect to policy concerns rather than constitutional ones.
28. See Goldsmith, supra note 13, at 1399, uses the term "unders(>ecification" to refer to the problems tnat arise when a norm. must be integrated lOto existing law, without clear guidance from the norm itself as to its place in domestic law.
Goldsmith continues, "[E]ven if federal law is underspecified [that is, when integration is necessary] ..• , such controversy is no more serious than analogous controversies that arise all the time from underspecification of federal law in domestic contexts." Id.
29. I must express the discomfort I felt as a domestic constitutionalla'\YYer reading arguments about the incotp:>ration and integration of international legal norms into domestic constitutional law. The predominant view appears to be that the analytic work is completed upon establishin~ that some particular norm is in fact a norm of international. law, sometImes on tlie ~ound that international legal norms by definition override contr~ domestIC ones. That would be true as well if the domestic processes by whIch international legal norms were integrated into domestic law made them hierarchically superior to other sources of domestic law. Such superiority may have (contlO~ently) characterized the New Deal-Great Society constitutional order. But, plalOly, it is not a necessary characteristic of the relation between international norms and constitutional law , including the constitutional law of federalism. It may be that the international legal norm prevails because it can be integrated into domestic constitutional law without alteration, but today establishing that proposition takes some arguments drawn from domestic constitutional law.
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THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:841 American Free Trade Agreement authorizes determination of binding domestic law by an appellate body whose members do not have die guarantees of tenure required by Article llI.30 Some have contendea that the treaty banmng the production of biological wea~ns authorizes searches within the United States that do not satis the Fourth Amendment's reguirements. 31 wo episodes involving the deadi penalty offer the opportunity to examine the integration of international human riglits norms with the domestic constitutional law of federalism. The first is the celebrated Breard litigation. 32 Breard was a national of Paraguay who was convicted In a Virginia court of capital murder and sentenced to death. 33 The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations provides that foreign citizens detained by officials in another nation must be informed promptly of their right to contact their embassy. 34 Breard did not receive that information. 35 After his conviction Breard filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal court, arguing that the failure to comply with the Vienna Convention's requirements entitled him to relief from his conviction. 36 In addition, Paraguay filed suit in the federal district court and in the Supreme Court against various Virginia officials, seeking an injunction against the execution. 37 And, finally, Paraguay filed an action against the United States in the International Court of Justice, which promptly issued an order directing the United States to ~take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Angel Francisco Breard is not executed pending the final decision in these 30 All the suits failed. Breard's habeas corpus suit was rejected because he had failed to present his claim under the Vienna Convention to the state courts in an appropriate manner.39 Pa~y:'s suits failed because a foreign nation IS not a "person" entitled by the relevant federal statute to sue state officials for constitutional violations,.fO because the Convention did not clearly provide a private right of action in which a nation could vacate a conviction,41 and perhaps because the Eleventh Amendment barred suits against the state officials. 42 Responding to the International Court of Justice's order of provisional measures, the U.S. Secretary of State wrote a letter requesting that Virginia's governor delay Breard's execution. 43 The u.S. Department of Justice took the position in its briefs to the Supreme Court that such a request was the only "measure at its disposal" under u.S. constitutionallaw.# The u.s. Supreme Court, after citing that letter, concluded, "H the Governor wishes to wait for the decision of the ICJ, that is his prerogative. But nothing in our existing case law allows us to make that choice for him. "45
Virginia was also involved in the other case on which I focus. Jens Soering and his girlfriend conspired to kill her parents. 46 64. The doctrine of speciality permits post-extradition limitations on the power to prosecute. Most reported specialty cases appear to involve limitations on the power of the U.S. government to prosecute after extradition, but state courts assume that they must enforce limitations pursuant to representations by the u.S. government. See, e.g., Washington v. Pang, 940 P.2d 1293 (Wash. 1997 (addressing the :proper interpretation 01 the doctrine of specialty while assuming its applicability). I note as well that it seems to be assumed that the doctrine applies to liiriitations on post-extradition punishment, or at least to representations that the death penalty will not be invoked. Additionally, a federal statute provides: "Whenever any person is delivered by any foreign government to an agent of the United States, for the purpose of being brou~t within the United States and tried for any offense of whIch he is duly accused, the President shall have power to take all necessary measures .... for [the accused person's] security against lawless violence." 18 U.S.C. § 3192 {1994}. Although the context clearly suggests a concern for protecting against mob violence, the term "lawless violence" might reasonably fie interpreted to refer to a state government's refusal to comply with the doctrine of specialty. Carlos Vazquez, Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, suggested to me that the extradition of a particular individual after a representation by the United States that triggers the doctrine of specialty might be regarded as an executive agreement made pursuant to the overarching extradition treaty, and as an executive agreement, it would bar states from acting in a manner inconsistent with the agreement under United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937), and United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) . Finally, the doctrine of specialty is available as a defense to a criminal prosecution, and is therefore applied by state 
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THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 853 action that intrudes on matters of state concern, whether by taking over a subject-matter ordinari!y regulated by state governments or by commandeering state officials. For example, authors ask whether the U.S. Constitution would preclude the nation from entering into an international agreement to ban the imposition of death sentences on those who were juveniles when they committed their crimes. But, proceeding by hypothetical may be particularly misleading today, in the new constitutional order because such agreements are exceedingly: unlikely to be adopted.
I begin with what should be obvious: Over the past generation the treaty-makers have been quite reluctant to endorse eXEansive exercises of the treaty power. They have routinely aaded a "federalism" declaration to international agreements dealing with human rights, and sometimes have expressly disclaimed the applicabili~ of particular treaty j>rovisions. 65 If anything, this practice is likely to strengthen in the new constitutional order.
The political ori~s of these "federalism" limitations are reasonably clear. The basic features of the national governing process over the past generation have been divided government and Increasingly hostile divisions between the Democratic and Republican parties. Acceding to the international agreements in question has been a priority of the human rights and internationalist wings of the Democratic party.66 They picked up 65. For a recent discussion and defense of the practice of making federalism and more specific reservations to U.S. ratification of international treaties, see Curtis A. Bradley &Jack 1. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 399 (2000) . On a techniCal level, federalism declarations mi~ht not preclude Congress from enacting constitutionally questionable legtslation and may not be judicially enforceable. But, more important, the federalism declarations tYEically state that the national ~overnment will implement the treaty to which the declaration is attached only m areas of traditional national auihori9!. Thus, on a political level, the government could defend any treaty-based legislation on the ground that it did not go beyond the sco~e of traditional national authority. Nonetheless, a Senate insistent enough on federalism to require that a federalism declaration be attached to a treaty is unlikely to approve treaty-based legislation raising federalism concerns. 
B. Federalism Limitations on the Power Over Foreign Affairs
Applying subject-matter limitations and the anti- based on such precatory provisions. I wonder, liowever, whether this makes too much of the difference between an obligation assumed by the national government to propose legislation and an ooligation to enact it: Why would a treaty partner accept the former without believing that it entailed the latter?
856
THE [Vol. 47:841 appropriate to the context of international relations would have to accommodate two concerns: the national interest in conducting international affairs, and federalism. The Court's federalism doctrine provides only hints at what such an accommodation might look like. Those hints suggest that the accommodation might place . in doubt national actions that go back to the early Republic. Applying the anti-commandeering principle to international affairs woUld have similar effects. The Court has supported the anticommandeering principle by pointing out that Congress has only recentlrs attempted to direct state officials to enforce national policy. 5 That argument seems unavailable with respect to national power over international affairs. Finally, the Court's articulation of the anti-commandeering principle aIlows a number of escape hatches, some of which are rather clearly applicable to the Breard and Soering litigation.
Subject-Matter Limitations
The Court has confronted the issue of subject-matter limitations in connection with two discrete grants of power to Congress, the Commerce Clause and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. The doctrine emerging from the Commerce Clause opinions is that Congress has power to regulate commercial activities that, in the aggregate, have a substantial. effect on interstate commerce, but may not refIlate non-commercial activities having the same aggregate effect. The Court's rationale for the rustinction between commercial and non-commercial activities is that some line must be drawn to ensure that the commerce power does not give Congress plen!uy authority to regulate whatever a majority decides to regulate,77 and that the language of the Commerce Clause supports drawing the line between commercial and non-commercial activities. 78 The Section Five decisions hold that Congress may enact legislation enforcing the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment's first section to the extent that the legislation is a proportionate response to demonstrated violations of those 369, 378 (2000) , describing this as the "noninftnity principle," that "anr justification for congressional power must not be one that would undermine the very notion of enumerated powers." 
See
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These rules are of course tied to the particular constitutional provisions at issue. The Commerce Clause opinions, however, have another theme. The Court explained the importance of interpreting constitutional provisions as placing limits on Congress's Eowers by emphasizing that more expansive interpretations would license Congress to act in areas traditionally re~lated primarily by the state. Those areas include education, ordfuary crone, and land use control. 80 This suggests that the Court ml~ht be interested in develo'pin~ a suoject-matter limitation directed not at the ConstitutIOn's enumerations of power, but rather at what used to be called the reserved powers of state governments.
These two approaches to subject-matter limitations will be difficult to develop in the context of Congress's power in international affairs. One problem is that the Court's federalism decisions have been concerned with what it characterized as innovative exercises of congressional power. For example, it used the fact that Con~ess had only recently begun to commandeer state executive officials in support of the anti-commandeering rule. 81 But, treaties in which the u.s. government agreed to legal rules that, according to contemEoraneous understandin~s, It could not otherwise enact go back to the early Republic. Even more, the Constitution unambiguously gives Congress the power to "define and punish ... Offences against the Law of Nations,,,83 some of which might be the subject of ordinary state criminal law . Professor David Golove notes early treaties overriding state laws barring aliens from owning real property, which might fall within the present Court's area of "land use regulation," despite the fact that THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:841 no one at the time thought that Congress had a general power, independent of its trea~-making power, to prescribe rules of real property law applica6le in the states. 84 Professor A. Mark Welsburd, describmg treaties upheld by the Supreme Court that overrode state laws regulating inheritance of lands by aliens, suggests that "regulation of ... those subjects would even today be difficult to bring within the powers of Congress described in Article I of the Constitution."8 What shal?e might a doctrine limiting the Treaty Power take?8& One might tnmk tliat just as regulation premised on the Commerce Clause must target truly commercial activities, so regulation premised on the Treaty Power or other international affairs powers must target subjects trUly appropriate for international agreement. 87 The problem with this suggestion is that it is quite aifficult to identity subject that are not appropriate for international agreement.
The difficulty comes in two forms. First, in a globalized world the line between domestic matters and international ones is increasingly difficult to draw-far more difficult than drawing the 84. See Golove, supra note 83, at 1157-88 (describing the controversy over the Jay TreaD' between the United States and Great Britain, which contained a provision allowing British subjects to own real property in the states, thus overriding the common law rule allowing forfeiture of real property owned by aliens). I note that the federal courts followed state common law on real l'rope!"tY even during the era of Swift v. Tyson. See, e.g. , Jackson v. Chew, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) , these autliors suggest that power over foreign iffairs was never lodged in the states, which therefore could not "reserve" any aspect of foreign affairs power from the Constitution's delegations to the national government. See, e.g., Chad Thornberry, Comment, Fediralism vs. Foreign Affairs: How the United States Can Administer Article 36 of the Vtenna Convention on Consular Relations Within the States, 31 MCGEORGE L. REv. 107, 139 (1999) ; Thomas Healy, Note, Is Missouri v. Holland Still Good Law? Federalism and the Treaty Power, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1726 REv. , 1748 REv. -50 (1998 .
The argument could be supplemented by observing that the Court adopted a related view in U.S. Term Ltmits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) . But, as one author observes, "One objection to this position is that it ... leaves the treaty power virtually unlimited. " Healy, supra, at 1750. If accepted, it would terminate the inquiry in which I am engaged here. In addition, adopting the position would be an aggressive assertion of national authority, in an era when the doctrinal trend is in the other direction. 
THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 859 line between commercial and non-commercial activities. 88 As
Pro~essor .Ta~k G<?ldsmith puts it, the difficulty of identifying u.s. foreIgn relatIons mterests is exacerbated by the waning of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs. . . . In truth there is no definitive way of diVining the U.S. foreign relations interest in a particular context or the manner in which this interest would be best accommodated. The Constitution gives these tasks l'rimarily to the political branches that have the expertIse and structure to perform them relatively well. 89 Second, and probably more important, determining what is a matter for international agreement IS not a unilateral deCISion made by the United States; it is a bilateral or multilateral one made in negotiations with other nations not necessarily concerned about U.S. domestic arrangements. So, for example, U.S. negotiators could come to the taole with proposals that, m u.s. constItutional terms, might deal solely with matters that are uncontroversially within the sC0l'e of the Treaty Power, such as international trade or the internatIonal rendition of fugitives from prosecution by the United States. The negotiating partners might see this as an occasion for raising other issues. For example, they might take the position that they will agree to extradite those charged with federal money-laundering offenses only if the United States agrees to prohibit the execution of juvenile offenders charged in both federal and state courts. 90 The U.S. treaty-makers-the President and the Senate-might agree to this proposal because they think the trade-off 88. See Bradley, supra note 3, at 451-52 ("Today, almost any issue can plausibly be labelea "international."). Bradley continues, "[E]ven if there were a workable distinction in theory between international and domestic matters, it seems unlikely that u.s. courts would feel competent to contradict the political branches on this issue. It is far from clear, for example, what standard tne courts could use to draw such a line." Id. at 453. 89. Goldsmith, supra note 13, at 1416. 90. The national government clearly has the power to eliminate the juvenile death penalty in federal prosecutions, and has done so. 18 U.S.C. § 3591{a) (1994). In the unlikely event that a negotiating partner insisted only that the juvenile death penalty be eliminated in state prosecutions, the federal negotiators might be more willing to concede than if they themselves had to forgo executing juvenile offenders. We might develop a doctrine that treaty provisions must deal even-handedly with the state and national governments, although I am skeptical about the possibility of developing a useful standard for determining when a provision operates in an even-handed way, and more skeptical about the need for a doctrine to guard against what seems to me a quite remote possibility.
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THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:841 is worth it. Standing alone, the ban on the execution of juvenile offenders might not be a matter appropriate for international agreement, but the extradition issue clearly is.91 It is hard to understand why U.S. negotiators' hands should be tied when they see~ to ac~o~plish what all would concede are appropriate foreignpolley obJectIves. The foregoing example suggests the difficulty with the other approach to subject-matter limItations, carving out enclaves where only the states may regulate. One can readily devise scenarios in whIch the treaty-maKers can accomplish concededly national objectives only by trading off some matters otherwise within the control of the states. For example, in the middle of a trade negotiation one of the trading partners says, "Well, we'll concede to you and allow the chstribution in our country of biotechnologically enhanced food products from the U.S., although our people are going to be pretty upset about that. To offset their concern, though, in exchange you've got to stop executing juvenile offenders anywhere in the United States." As Professor Weisburd puts it, the United States enters negotiations with other nations "because it wants something from die other party or parties to the treaty, not because it seeks to use the treaty as a mechanism for domestic regulation," but "[ d]omestic effects may be inevitable. "92 It is implausible to impute to the Framers, or to any reasonable manner of constructing a national government, an interest in creating a structure tnat bars the national government from achieving national objectives in a manner that interferes with state prerogatIves, when compelled to do so bY' its negotiatin~ partners. 93 The preceding argument also responds to the Court s expressed concern that constitutional doctrine must not authorize Congress 91. Mari Matsuda suggested in conversation that one could defend the position that the treaty power had no subject-matter limits even in the absence of explicit trade-offs. The U.S. treaty-makers could reasonably take the position that their bargaining position in a range of negotiations is strengthened by a perception among the negotiating partners that the United States is a law-abiding nation that honors internationalliuman rights norms. On this argument, even a free-standing treaty banning the death penalty for juvenile offenders would be a Eermissible exercise of the treaty power because adopting such a treaty would enhance the U.S. position in other negotiations about matters that unquestionably deal with matters of international concern. 92. Weisburd, supra note 30, at 921. 93. Again, the bior multilateral nature of foreign affairs distinguishes these negotiations from policy-making in a purely domestic context, where only Congress and the President decide what policies to fursue. In the treaty context, the U.S. treaty-makers initially decide on the nation s preferred policies, but they then must respond to counter-proposals by other nations.
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THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 861 to do whatever its members think is wise policy, without regard to the source of their power to do good things. The Court's concern arises from the perception that Congress may act on its own, to do what it wants. The treaty context comes close to eliminating the possibility of unilateral action by Congress or the treaty-makers: national law-makers cannot do whatever they want, but only what other nations require them to do in order to extract from those other nations an agreement to do something in the U.S. national interest. The bargaining context, that is, sets the limits on Con~ess's unilateral action that the Court has sought through constitutional doctrine in the purely domestic context.
Professor Curtis Bradley has suggested one final subject-matter limitation. Under his proposal, Congress's power in international affairs, and in particular the treaty power, would not be an independent source of national authority.94 That is, no law could survive a federalism-based challenge unless its defenders could identify some source of congressional power other than the treaty power that is sufficient to authorize the statute. Professor Bradley's proposal is reminiscent of controversies in an earlier era over whether the Spending Clause was an independent source of national power, or wliether instead Congress could appropriate money to achieve objectives determined only: by some other enumerated power. The Supreme Court rejected tlie latter proposition,95 thus avoiding the problem that the alternative interpretation would have renderea the Spending Clause redundant. Redundancy is something of a problem In connection with Professor Bradley's proposal as well, because it would not authorize the national government to do an~hing domestically that it could not do anyw:ay.96 Professor Bradley points out, however, that his proposal would not make the Treaty Power completely redundant, because it would authorize the national government to enter into agreements that would bind it internationally. Any breaches would be subject to international sanction. Note, however, that Professor Bradley's proposal means that the United States simply cannot comply with some provisions in international agreements the Constitution allows it to make. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that, under his proposal, the nation woula be in Violation of its international obligations at the moment it entered the agreement. Again, it is difficult to understand why one would design a constitution having that shape.
A requirement that international agreements deal with matters In sum, it is quite hard to devise a reasonable subject-matter 97. Professor Golove, while criticizing the view that there are subject-matter limits on the treaty power, agrees that sham treaties cannot be enforced domestically against feoeralism objections. See Golove, supra note 83, at 1287 ("[T]he l'urpose of a treaty cannot be to adopt domestic standards just because the Presldent and Senate oelieve them to be laudable."). See also HENKIN, supra note 87, at 143 ("A treaty ... must be a bonafide a$reement between states, not a 'mock marriage', nor a unilateral act by the Umted States to which a foreign government lenas itself as an accommodation .... ").
98. A somewhat more realistic possibility is a treaty whose domestic implications are strongly favored by the U.S. nego~iators even though those implications are otherwise beyond the national government's power. The negotiators might then make larger concessions to the negotiating partners. A doctrine responsive to this concern would have to allow U.S. negotiators to agree to such provisions if they extracted "enough" in exchange, and pretty clearly would not be an attractive one for courts to administer. 99. I note another difficulty with the concern for sham treaties. Why would the negotiating partner simply 00 the U.S. treaty-makers a favor? They mi&ht see the U.S. offer as an opportunity to extract something in exchange. And, If that something is an appropriate subject for international agreement, such as a trade concession, we woUld again be in the position of having an agreement part of which is within the nation's power and part of which is (by hypothesis) not. As argued above, such mixed agreements would almost certainly survive constitutional scrutiny. For completeness, I note the possibility of a doctrine condemning treaties as shams where the international coml'0nent in a mixed agreement was simply a facade for the treaty's true goal. Agam, the possibilities that the treaty-makers would enter such agreements, and that the courts would be able reliably to identify them, are so small that developing a doctrine along these lines seems inadvisable.
THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 863 limitation on Congress's power in the international domain. Even in the new constitutional order, an agreement to eliminate the juvenile death penalty should be upheld. loo The United States is unlikely to enter into such an agreement.
The Anti-Commandeering Principle
There is an obvious objection to the main argument in the preceding section. Suppose the negotiating partners demanded that the u.S. government enact, not a law impermissible for federalism reasons, but a law violating the First Amendment. IOI The New Deal-Great Society order accepted the proposition that the forei~ affairs ~ower was limited by the Constitution's protections of libe~. 02 But, ifthe United States can override federalism concerns to achieve its foreign policy goals, why can it not override the Bill of Rights for the same reason?
One answer may simply be that the New Deal-Great Society constitutional order accepted a shary distinction between individual liberties, enumerated in the Constitution, and what Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes called the "invisible radiation" of the Tenth ~men~eI}t.103 Another ~swer may be that the T~eaty Pow:e~ is mdeed hffilted by federalism concerns, conceptualized' as ansmg independent of the substantive scope of the Treaty Power.l04 The issue then becomes one of identifYing an appropriate federalism doctrine limiting, not just the Treao/ Power, but all enumerated powers. At present the only: candidate for such a doctrine is the anti-commandeering principle. , The Vienna Convention's reguirement that police officials advise forei~ nationals of their riglits under the Convention seems a strai~ht-forward example of commandeering pursuant to a treaty. 5 Other treaties ffilght direct state officials to comply with 100. Should here is both predictive and normative. 101. For example, a law bringing the United States in line with the international consensus that hate speecn should be illegal could possibly violate the First Amendment (to the extent that such hate speech laws are unconstitutional).
102. See HENKIN, suprfl note 87, at 254-66 (describing the liberty-based limitations on the foreign affairs power).
103. See Missouri v. Holland; 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920) .
104. One formulation is that subject-matter limitations identify internal limits on each enumerated power, limits that are specific to each such power, while individual-rights limitations are external to all the enumerated powers and cut across them all.
105. See Vazquez, supra note 74, at 1339 (describing the Convention's requirements as commandeering); Healy, supra note 86, at 1746 (same). THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:841 international human rights norms in ways requiring that they act rather than refrain from acting. l06 Similarly, treaties might require that effective remedies be provided for violations of human rights. Creating such remedies might require legislation. l07 Do these possibilIties raise constitutional questions?
The Court's anti-commandeering decisions describe a quite limited exception that might be applicable to the Vienna Convention problem, though not to the others. The exception, described by Justice O'Connor and not disclaimed by the Court, would allow Congress to require state officials to compile information and report that information to federal officials. lOS The decisions do not provide a justification for this exception. 109 The Court asserted tnat it lacked the capacity to determine whether congressional requirements were too burdensome,l1o so it cannot be that information-compilation does not impose real burdens on state officials. The most prominent functional reason the Court offered 106. I believe that there is an anal~ic problem lurking in the Court's apparent distinction between im,permissible affirmative commandeering and permissible negative commandeenngthrough preemption of state authority. For a discussion, see Tushnet, supra note 22, at 27. For present purposes, however, I accept the proposition that affirmative commandeering is impermissible but preemption IS acceptable. But note Vazquez, supra note 74, at 1347 -48, 1350 , uses Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1923 , which upheld a treaty provision (from the Treaty on Commerce and NaVIgation, Feb. 21, 1911, U.S.-Japan, 37 Stat. 1504), that effectively required the city to consider license applicatlOns from Japanese citizens, to illustrate the proposition that "it is notoriously difficult to draw the line between affirmative and negative obligations." 107. Accordin~ 
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THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 865 for the anti-commandeering doctrine is that commandeering diffuses political responsibility by making it unclear to citizens whether they should complain to local officials or to their representatives in Congress about some action they dislike. Ill Commentators have questioned the cogency of this ~ment, 112 but perhaps it explains why Congress may require state officials to compile iiiformation. The Court migJIt believe that few citizens are likely to complain about state officials' efforts to obtain the information Congress requires, or that Congress has asked state officials merely to assemble in a form Congress requires information they already have obtained for their own purposes. I have my doubts about these factual propositions, but something like them must underlie a functional explanation of the exception to the anti-commandeering doctrine.
Perhaps Congress ml~ht reguire notification as well as information-compilation. ll Notification is, in one sense, simply information-compilation in reverse: Instead of asking someone for information, the police officials provide information to that person. And yet, the Court's functional concerns seem to come into play here. Providing the required information might be burdensome, particularly wilen the police officials must locate a consular official who might be far away.1l4 Obviously the person receiving the information is unlikely to complain. But what about the victims and their families? Notifying a criminal suspect of his or her rights is controversial when the notification is required by the Court's interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, because, critics think, it interferes with the ability of the _government effectively to enforce the criminal law . Might not notification required by a treaty be at least as controversial? Describing the problem after a failure to notify has occurred, one commentator observes that executive offiCials face "a difficult decision ... -whether to adhere to an international obligation that most of their constituents probably did not know of or understand, or whether to adhere to their states' criminal justice concerns .... "115 The public might well project the same conflict back to the time when notification is actually given. The ar~ment from diffusion of political responsibility in controversial settinfis seems no less powelful here than in the cases the Court decided. 6 Perhaps one might conceptualize a notification requirement somewhat differently. As noted earlier, the Court's anticommandeering doctrine applies to efforts by Congress to commandeer state legislative and executive officials, but die Court allows Congress to commandeer state judicial officers. The doctrine thus i~licates the separation of powers on the state level. Modern separatlon-of-powers aoctrine has two competing_strands. 117 In one, the three branches are sharply separated. According to this strand, a notification requirement would clearly be imposed on state executive officials, and would be subject to the anti-commandeering requirement. In the other strand g however, the lines are blurred, largely for functional reasons. ll This strand might support an argument locatin~ the notification requirement somewhere on the edges of the judiCial branch because notification is closely bound up with criminal prosecutions heard by the courtS. 119 Once again history might justify some degree of commandeenng pursuant to tlie Treaty Power. According to Professor A. Mark Weisburd, "early treaties included topics that apparently required action by local executive officials.,,120 One 115.Id. at 126-27. Thornberry notes that of course governors will take the latter course, quoting then-Governor George W. Bush: "In general, I will uphold the laws of the State of Texas, regardless of the nationality of the person involved." [d.
116. I do not mean to claim that the argument is powerful or persuasive in its original context, but only that it is no less powerful or persuasive in the present one. Professor Welsburd acknowledges die possibility that a duty imposed on state officials in 1788 was transferred to federal officials when the national. government was organized, but argues that doing so "would have required the establishment of a substantial federal eo lice force in a good many port cities," a requirement that he correctly thinks Implausible to attribute to the Framers. TRANSNAT'LL. 997, 1030 (1998 (arguing that a state's failure to notify foreign nationals of their rights under the Vienna Convention might be said to interfere with the purposes of the Convention). If this is a valid argument, then the Convention would preempt something, but it is not entir~!y clear what: maybe the state's prosecution or state rules immunizing police officers frem monetary liabilitr for unlawful action. Deeken argues that the Convention itself does not establiSh a rule requiring the exclusion of evidence acquired as a result of a failure to comply with the Convention's notification requirement. [d. at 1036-38. 122. See Vazquez, supra note 74.
123. Id. at 1325. Tlie national government's power to deny state officials authority to arrest or prosecute foreign nationals arises from its power over foreign relations. Other nations might trust the u.s. government out not subnational governments, and might insist in negotiatIOns that only the U.S. government prosecute their nationals, even for ordinary crimes. That possibility IS sufficient to establish that the u.s. government has the power to preempt the application of state criminal laws to foreign nationals. THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:841 commandeering rule. As Professor Vazquez points out, the statutes the Court invahdated as commandeering state officials could readily be re-cast-and even merely re-interpreted-as conditionally preempting state law. 124 A broadly construed doctrine authorizing commandeering by means of conditional ~reemption would make the anti-commandeering principle one truly of form alone. That said, the power to commandeer through conditional preemption would seem expansive enough to encompass virtually any imaginable international agreement that would effectively require states to comply with international human rights norms. Consider again the death penalty for juvenile offenders. Recall that I have argued that it is nearly impossible to devise a doctrine that would take some subject matter off the table for international negotiation. H that argument is right, there can be no subject-matter limitation barring the national government from regulating ordinary crime. Pursuant to a treaty, then, Congress could enact a statute making every capital crime committed by a juvenile in states with the juvenile death penalty exclusively a federal offense, punishable by something other than death. With the power to preempt, Congress can then exercise the conditional-preemption power and authorize states to prosecute juvenile offenders but only on condition that they not be subject to capital punishment. 125 Perhaps the intuitIon behind the anti-commandeering principle can be salvaged by transforming the Court's concern with the diffusion of political responsibility. As Professor Weisburd puts it, the early treaties «do not purport to brinij about Jundtimental changes in state governmental structures." 26 As noted above, Congress's self-serving purposes and impulse to aggrandize its power at the expense of the states might be constrained at least a bit m the treaty context. This is because the other nations with whom the treaty-makers deal may have no interest in helping Congress become more powerful. In this context, then, a rule more limited than the anti-commandeering one might be defensible: the treatymakers cannot enter into agreements that would fundamentally 124. See Vazquez, supra note 74, at 1327-28 (suggestin~ a rewriting of the Brady Act to invoke the power to preempt on condition); see also Janet R. Carter, Note, Commandeering Undei-the Treaty Power, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 598, 618 (2001) (arguing that "finding such proposals to be within Con~ress's powers would open the door to complete circumvention of states' rights ).
125. This example is a oit off-key, because barring states from executing juvenile offenders is not precisely a form of affirmative commandeering. A better example may be a requirement that states that prosecute juvenile offenders confme them in prisons for a federally prescribed number of years.
See
Weisburd, supra note 30, at 918 (emphasis added); see also HENKIN, supra note 87, at 148 (describing a similar constraint).
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THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 869 change state governments. But, once again, we might wonder about the need for such a doctrine in the modem era. The treaty-makers are hardly likely to accede to requests from other nations that would have die effect of wreaking such fundamental changes.
V. CONCLUSION I have argued that the contours of federalism doctrines limiting U.S. national power in the international arena are difficult to define, and in any event address purely hYJ:?othetical problems that are unlikely to be real matters of policy-making concern in the new constitutional order. However, were the Court to announce a limiting doctrine, it might change the domestic playing field. It would present proponents of incorporating internationaI human rights norms into U.S. domestic law with another argument, beyond the existing, essentially: policy-based ones, that they would have to overcome. To do so, tney might well have to make some concessions of their own, leading to the adoption of a treaty in a different form from the one that would have been adopted were it clear that the treao/-makers had plenary power. Resolving the controversy over the existence of federalism limits on the treaty power thus has consequences even in the new constitutional era. The United States is unlikely to adopt the most expansive international human rights proposals currently: on the international agenda. It mig~t, however, agree to some modest proposals. Were tEe treaty-making community: (academics, members of Congress, executive branch officials, and Judges) to accept the proposition that there are federalism limits on the treaty power, whatever the United States adopts will be even more limited.
Weare in the early days of the new constitutional order. I have argued that we can expect few bold initiatives from either the treaty-makers or the courts in this new order. The Supreme Court has articulated doctrines that might be developed m ways that would work large changes in what the past generation assumed the treaty-makers could do. We should expect, though, that the doctrines will not be developed in such ways. Nor should we ex,pect that the need will arise for the courts to invoke doctrines linuting national power in the name of federalism. 127
